French Foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution by Kecskés D., Gusztáv
G. D. KECSKÉS  COJOURN 1:3 (2016) 
French Foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution 





1956 - Budapest: the time and the place are associated in the minds of many Frenchmen. 
The name of the Hungarian capital became one of the most painful symbols of the last 
days of the 4th Republic: after Budapest, many Frenchmen were forced to face their own 
illusions about the socialist countries. Public opinion and the French press became 
interested in the tragedy with the intensity commensurate to the significance of the Fall 
of 1956. The topic of the activity of the French government and its motivations in the 
national and especially the international context has remained obscure for several 
decades. The opening of the archives in the West as well as in the former Soviet bloc 
permits us to reconstruct a subtle picture of the Hungarian Revolution’s repercussions in 
France. 
 




First, we briefly present the policy of the French Foreign Ministry – the Quai d’Orsay – 
towards Hungary before the explosion of the revolution, as well during and after the 
events. Subsequently, we will measure the factors that have exerted an influence on 
French diplomacy during the process of decision-making related to the Hungarian crisis. 
The liberalization in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, often described as 
a “thaw”, which later extended to the other European countries under Soviet influence, 
was favorably accommodated by Western diplomacy, including by the Quai d’Orsay. 
Nevertheless Western diplomats were perfectly conscious of their narrow room for 
manoeuvre stemming from the European status quo that resulted from the end of the 
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Second World War, and the emerging reality of the Cold War: the bipolar international 
system. They did not want to accelerate the process by hasty steps. This passive and 
careful policy was continued after the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution on October 
23, 1956, an event that surprised Paris – just as it surprised the leaderships in other 
western countries. 
As is known, on July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, has 
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The meticulous preparation 
of the military response by France in collaboration with Great Britain and also with Israel, 
the Israeli attack of October 29 against Egypt, followed by the launching of the Franco-
British intervention in the Suez Canal zone limited the number of options available, and 
was a source of the passivity of the French government whose attention was fixed self-
evidently on the Middle East.2 
When the representatives of the French government expressed their sympathy 
towards the revolution and condemned the Soviet policy of repression carried out in 
Hungary, they attempted to avoid declarations that might cause tensions with the USSR. 
The UN provided the ideal framework and forum for such a policy. Later, however, the 
putting into the forefront of the Hungarian case in the United Nations still appeared 
necessary to the French Foreign Ministry, as well as to the British Foreign Office, who 
were eager to mitigate the fallout from the near-universal international condemnation of 
their policy in Suez. The two allies wished to attain that the extraordinary session of the 
General Assembly of the UN, convened on November 1 to deal with the war of Suez, 
have on its agenda the Hungarian issue as well. They thus hoped to divide, and partly 
divert, attention from the crisis in the Middle East. However, with a view to the position 
of the Third World countries in the matter the government of the United States blocked 
this project. Consequently the question of the Hungarian revolution was officially 
discussed on the UN’s agenda only after the invasion by the Soviet Army on the 4th of 
November. 
The policy of prudence and non-intervention was also manifest in the fact that 
French diplomacy did not take any initiative to influence the events within the Soviet 
bloc. The activities of the Quai d’Orsay were limited to the collection, transmission and 
interpretation of information. Even though the French diplomats did good work in this 
                                                          
2 On October 22-24, 1956 secret Anglo-Franco-Israeli negotiations took place in Sèvres, during which the 
participants defined the scenario for the war of Suez. On the relations between the Suez campaign and the 
Hungarian revolution, see Kecskés D., 2001. 
G. D. KECSKÉS  COJOURN 1:3 (2016) 
respect, their conclusions did not weigh heavily in the balance. The obvious priorities 
were Suez and the maintenance of the European status quo. 
 
The Hungarian case and French domestic politics 
Under the conditions of the Cold War, French foreign policy was inextricably intertwined 
with internal ideological struggles (Grosser, 1972: 35). Disputes over the principles of 
communism and the values of the “Free World” had reached a climax exactly over the 
Hungarian Revolution (Bernard, 1991: 80), thus, contrary to how it may seem, it was an 
internal rather than an international event for France. The government considered the 
Algerian War (ongoing since 1954), the Suez Crisis, and the establishment of European 
integration, to be its foreign policy priorities.  
The extremely intense reaction of the population3 and the political establishment 
can be explained by several factors. In the overly politicized atmosphere of the Cold War, 
French public opinion watched the freedom fight of the Hungarians living on the “other 
side” of the Iron Curtain closely. The French media devoted considerable space to the 
events, and the overwhelming majority of the population were outraged by the brutal 
actions of the Soviet Union, as well as by the approval of these actions by the French 
Communist Party.4 The Hungarian Revolution represented freedom, i.e. the most 
important value in a Western mentality (Békés, 1996a: 26), and it revived the French 
revolutionary tradition which was the constant theme of Republican cult. The mass 
publication in the French press of the images of combat in Budapest brought up intense 
memories of the Second World War in the consciousness of a major part of the 
population. 
The crushing of the Hungarian Revolt by the Soviets, on the one hand, and the 
Suez Crisis, on the other, provided ammunition to both anti-communist and communist 
political forces whose confrontation lasted for a long time. Although the National 
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Assembly seldom dealt with questions of foreign policy under the 4th Republic, the 
Hungarian uprising occupied an important place in the debates of October-November 
1956.5 The parliamentary instruments were abundantly used: three requests for 
interpellation and four motions for a resolution were presented. The Committee on 
Foreign Affairs was also focused on the Hungarian question. 
How can we explain this intense interest? The repression of the Hungarian 
Revolution by the Soviets provided a good opportunity to publicly take a stand against 
the French Communist Party which openly supported the approach of Moscow. The 
attitude of the Communist Party was condemned almost unanimously. In the face of these 
intense attacks, the communist deputies attacked the colonial policies of the government, 
in particular the Franco-British intervention in Suez. The extreme hostility between the 
two opposing sides clearly shows the great significance of these questions. On the 7th of 
November, the President of the National Assembly adjourned the meeting for 15 minutes 
because of unrest in the chamber. The use of old arguments which did not have any 
relationship with the question discussed proves that this was a deeper conflict (for 
example the communist Members of Parliament often referred back to the Second World 
War: “Hitler”, “collaborator”, “Gestapo”, etc. were terms frequently used by them) . 
Nevertheless most deputies attempted to express their solidarity with the 
Hungarian people through the  resolution of November 7th: 
“The National Assembly bows before those who sacrificed their lives in Hungary for 
the independence of their country as well as in defense of freedom and the holy rights 
of humanity; it expresses its admiration for the unshakeable courage of the martyr 
Hungarian nation, as it proved its dedication to true political and social democracy, 
stood up to an oppressor whose actions are against humanity; the Assembly requests 
that the government do everything possible, […] in cooperation with other free 
nations, to help the Hungarians who remained in their country or escaped; and that 
the government take every step possible so that the free nations do everything to 
prevent the deportation of Hungarians who took part in the uprising...”6 
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The political tensions also translated into protests and solidarity marches in the 
streets. The resolution of November 7th marked the climax of tensions in Paris. On the 
initiative of the French Association for the Atlantic Community, a very broad range of 
political organizations called for a gathering on this day at the Triumphal Arch (l'Arc de 
triomphe) at 6 p.m.7 A demonstration of solidarity was held by about 30,000 people with 
the participation of several members of the Guy Mollet government, many representatives 
of the National Assembly, and former Prime Ministers. At the end of the demonstration 
about 5,000 participants, mostly young people, besieged the offices of the French 
Communist Party and its newspaper L’Humanité. Many people were wounded in the 
melée and three were killed (Bernard, 1991: 73-74). 
The Hungarian affair provided an excellent opportunity for gaining internal 
political advantages. The Socialists began a forceful campaign against the Communists 
who compromised themselves through the Hungarian tragedy and attempted to lure away 
their voters. They even made serious efforts to win over Communist activists.8 We might 
even suspect that there were political reasons behind the considerable government 
solidarity efforts (led by the socialists) and the help provided to Hungarian refugees. The 
cabinet of Guy Mollet thus used the Hungarian question as an instrument of domestic 
policy. 
At the same time it is necessary to see the limits of the repercussions of the 
Hungarian uprising in France. A few weeks after the Soviet intervention of the 4th of 
November, at the end of December 1956, the interest of the public in the Hungarian 
tragedy decreased considerably. The French political establishment had already pulled 
the Hungarian cause off the agenda. In spite of the extraordinary speed of the reaction, 
the echoes of the Hungarian crisis in France did not bring any lasting or fundamental 
changes, neither in the views of the public, nor in the political life of the country. The 
direction of the PCF (Partie communiste français) led by Maurice Thorez managed to 
overcome its difficulties in a few weeks. The position occupied by the Communist Party 
in the French political life didn’t really change: it kept its deputies and its electoral base. 
                                                          
7 For example: Centre des républicains sociaux, Centre national des indépendants, Parti radical socialiste, 
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We thus showed above how the French Government used the Hungarian Crisis in 
order to divert the attention from the Suez Crisis, while placing the Hungarian uprising 
center-stage. With the instrumentalisation of this cause, the Guy Mollet cabinet thus 
employed the same tactics it had used in domestic affairs. The Government contributed 
to the mobilization of public opinion against the Communists by using a national 
commemoration and charity event organized by the Interior Ministry as well as exploiting 
opportunities presented by the media (especially radio). The largest such event was a 
“national day” scheduled for November 18th, “for the cause of the Hungarian people”.9 
We cannot find any traces of the effect of public pressure in the foreign policy decision-
making regarding the Hungarian question. The great repercussions in France over the 
repression of the Hungarian insurrection were used again when the French diplomats cited 
the events in Hungary in their speeches on various international fora, in particular in the 
United Nations.10 
 
French foreign policy and its sources in the international context 
The behavior of the French Government in the diplomatic field after the defeat of the 
Hungarian Revolution fell perfectly in line with the general direction of Western policy 
at the time.  The main effort remained the collection, transmission and interpretation of 
information. Let us enumerate and illustrate the factors which influenced the attitude of 
the Quai d’Orsay. 
The evident explanation for the French attitude is the position of the country in 
the international system. Considering the close relations of France to the “Western camp”, 
it appears normal that the French Government expressed in public its condemnation of 
the Soviet Union and the Kádár government, which came to power in Hungary as a 
consequence of crushing the revolution. Such an attitude corresponded with the 
expectations of the public. French diplomacy showed its disapproval in the course of the 
debates of resolutions of the UN General Assembly, in its bilateral relationship with the 
Soviet Union and Hungary by adopting the diplomatic boycott of the NATO countries, 
                                                          
9 AN: rapports des préfets 1954-1959, F1 C III 1350: Voeux et motions concernant la Hongrie (extraits de 
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10 See the speech of Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, delivered in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on November 19, 1956. AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 243, n° 2526 
(November 19, 1956), télégramme de V. Broustra, chef de la Mission permanente de la France auprès de 
l’Organisation des nations unies. 
G. D. KECSKÉS  COJOURN 1:3 (2016) 
by receiving large numbers of Hungarian refugees, and finally by the support granted to 
the Hungarian political émigré organizations. However the French decision-makers did 
not want to go beyond a certain point. In short, they continued to play painstakingly 
according to the rules of the Cold War, in particular sticking to the inviolable taboo of the 
spheres of influence. This prudence was translated in the general attitude and approach 
of the French Foreign Ministry in this area: it did not try to exert its influence on the 
course of the Hungarian revolutionary events, or in their aftermath. Consequently, the 
major part of the diplomatic activities of the French Government was carried out outside 
of the area directly affected by the crisis, in the negotiating rooms and halls of the United 
Nations and NATO. 
In the United Nations where the Hungarian question was on the agenda of the 
General Assembly for more than six years, until December 1962, the aim set by the 
French Government became more and more obvious: in collaboration with the 
Americans, it wished to exert an influence on world public opinion, especially on Third 
World countries by showing them “the true face” of the Soviet Union. The Atlantic 
Alliance, in addition to the consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs, was 
used to harmonize the policies of its member countries. Even if Paris took a zealous part 
in the diplomatic boycott against Moscow and Budapest, it is characteristic of its behavior 
that the retaliatory measures of NATO were removed vis-à-vis the USSR, in January 
1957, without keeping any account of the Western public opinion.11 However, they held 
the Kádár government in isolation for much longer, even as they knew that it was only a 
puppet government. The maintenance of the boycott against the official Hungarian 
authorities appeared to carry less risk, and cause less harm, for the Quai d’Orsay which 
could thus satisfy the expectations of French public opinion. In spite of this 
“reservedness,” the French Government did not intend to break relations completely. It 
meticulously avoided any action that could have endangered the operations and/or the 
existence of the French legation in Hungary.12 Therefore, it should not have come as a 
surprise that the French diplomatic mission in Budapest used its contacts with resistance 
groups and the opposition of the Kádár regime merely as sources of information. Isolated 
                                                          
11 AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.012 (January 9, 1957), télégramme d’Alexandre Parodi, 
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diplomatiques avec la Hongrie (early 1957?), Documents diplomatiques francais (hereafter DDF), 1957, t. 
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examples of cooperation occurred in the first few months after the suppression of the 
revolution. 
There was a certain caution in handling the question of political emigration. For 
example, although the French authorities permitted the Hungarian Revolutionary Council 
to hold its founding conference in Strasbourg in early January 1957, they declared at the 
same time unequivocally that they would not allow the refugees to acquire weapons or 
transport them on French territory.13 Such a gesture could have led to an open conflict 
with the Soviet Union. Finally, the French representative in NATO opposed the idea of 
publicizing the fact that the Alliance was deliberating on the Hungarian question,14 not 
only during the revolution but also in December 1956. Regarding the assistance to the 
refuge students, the Quai d’Orsay stated that “it would be preferable to avoid any direct 
action of NATO.”15 
In close connection with the previously described factors, a second factor 
influenced the French diplomatic behavior, which was the intention to coordinate its 
actions in a tightknit multilateral co-operation, meaning close cooperation with the United 
States and Great Britain. French diplomats conducted intensive discussions with their 
allies about the relations with the Kádár Government, the taking in of Hungarian refugees, 
and the actions intended to provide humanitarian aid to the population of Hungary. If an 
initiative by the French had not been supported by the NATO allies, the Quai d’Orsay 
abandoned it; this was the fate of a French proposal for economic aid to Hungary in the 
first month of 1957.16 
Once the Suez Crisis passed, the influence of this factor decreased gradually on 
French decision-making and the Algerian problem took a more prominent role, with the 
war there lasting until 1962. The policy carried out in Algeria reduced to a certain extent 
the room for manoeuvre of France at the United Nations. All in all, we can say that the 
bipolar system of international relations did not cease to be a determining factor for 
French diplomacy towards Hungary during the aftermath of the revolution. It was its 
                                                          
13 AMAE: Europe 1944-1960, Hongrie, dossier 97, (December 13, 1956). Note de la Sous-direction 
d’Europe orientale pour le secrétaire général, Création en Occident d’un « Comité national révolutionnaire 
» hongrois. 
14 AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 242, n° 50.408 (October 27, 1956), 
télégramme d’A. Parodi, représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l’OTAN. 
15 Archives du secrétariat international de l’OTAN (thereafter ASIO, Bruxelles): AC/52-R/67 (January 8, 
1957), procès-verbal de la réunion du Comité de l’information et des relations culturelles tenue au Palais 
de Chaillot, Paris, le 18 décembre 1956 à 15 heures. 
16 AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.132 (March 6, 1957), télégramme d’A. Parodi, représentant 
permanent de la France auprès du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord, Aide à la Hongrie. 
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strategic determinant and French interests in the Middle East were the tactical and 
temporary drivers of French policy. 
The division of the world into separate spheres of influence meant a policy of non-
intervention, even a passive stance, for the French Government. The policy of the 
peaceful subversion of the socialist countries, which meant encouraging them to pursue 
more independent foreign policies from the Soviet Union, and more liberal policies at 
home, through economic, political and cultural contacts (Békés, 1996: 77) was the line 
from which France never deviated. More energetic measures were, however, not 
envisioned. The acceptance of Hungary’s neutrality during the revolution or foreign 
minister Pineau’s proposal for Hungary’s neutralization presented at the National 
Assembly17 on December 18, 1956 cannot be considered as serious political moves. The 
international weight of France did not allow for such grand initiatives to be effective. In 
the same way, similar remarks by Jean Paul-Boncour, minister of France in Hungary, 
addressed to Chou En-laï, president of the Chinese Council of Ministers in January 1957 
in Budapest, were in fact only a simple attempt at demonstrating France’s “proactive” 
policy at no great risk.18 
The other factors, namely the impact of the Suez Crisis and later the War in 
Algeria were not without influence on French foreign policy, in particular in the United 
Nations. However, these conflicts played only a minor role and were of a tactical nature 
compared to the European status quo. The extremely intense reaction of French society 
and the French political establishment had only a limited impact on the decision making 
at the Quai d’Orsay. Admittedly, French diplomats felt towards Hungary a similar 
compassion to the one expressed by the greater public (Kecskés D., 1999: 155-171), 
nevertheless, the great emotional reaction and the individual demonstrations of sympathy 
did not have any impact on the eventual policy. 
The Hungarian crisis remained beyond the sphere of French interest. Its 
representatives acted directly only in the UN, NATO, and in working for the Hungarian 
refugees. In other words, Paris concentrated its activities in areas where it could act 
                                                          
17 JORF, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, compte rendu in extenso des séances, 
questions écrites et réponses des ministres à ces questions, troisième législature, session 
ordinaire de 1956-1957, 1ère séance du 18 décembre 1956, p. 6090. 
18 Télégramme de Jean Paul-Boncour, ministre de France en Hongrie, n° 65 à 69 (January 18, 
1957), DDF, 1957, t. I, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
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without the fear of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. French diplomacy 
considered the continuation of disarmament and détente as its primary objective, and it 
therefore believed that the maintenance of dialogue with the Soviet Union was more 
important than providing support for the liberation of the peoples of East-Central Europe. 
This position was stated clearly when Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister, 
was executed; the two issues would not be linked. 
As Étienne de Crouy-Chanel, the French permanent representative in the NATO 
Council on June 20, 1958 stated:19 
“The dialogue between East and West belongs to a different page, its stake is too high for us 
to be led solely by our emotion. Public opinion, which would probably understand if we 
discontinued the dialogue with the Soviet Union today because of the execution of Nagy, in 
a few months, however, would probably rebuke us for doing so. Therefore, we do not believe 
in breaking off relations.” 
It is evident from the available sources that the government of Guy Mollet did not 
consider the Hungarian uprising to be of primary concern, neither internally nor 
diplomatically. During meetings of the Council of Ministers at the time of the Hungarian 
Revolution, the issue was discussed only once. The first decision concerning the 
Hungarian Revolution was made on November 7th, when they made a decision on 
accepting refugees.20 
 In November-December 1956, during discussions with the most important allies 
of the French Government, the Hungarian Revolution was rarely mentioned, or was 
entirely neglected. At a meeting between the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and 
Guy Mollet on November 6th, the major topic of discussion was European integration.21 
Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador to Washington, when visiting President 
Eisenhower on November 8th, emphasized that the alliance between the United States, 
Great Britain, and France, should be strengthened because the Suez Crisis shook the 
                                                          
19 AMAE: Services des pactes, boîte 241, n° 57 (June 20, 1958), télégramme d’Étienne de Crouy-Chanel, 
représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l’OTAN. 
20 The author did not have an opportunity to study the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers. 
The article relies here on the remarks made by Patricia Gillet, archivist at the Section of the 20th century of 
the National Archives (Paris), who communicated certain information to the author, and on the examination 
of the cartons F60 2766 (Ordre du jour du Conseil des ministres, 1956-1958, dossier: janvier 1956-
décembre 1956) and F60 2772 (communiqués de presse des Conseils des ministres, dossier: janvier 1956-
décembre 1959). 
21 AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1966), « Entretiens et message », 3 septembre 1956-septembre 1957, 
procès-verbal de l’entretien du 6 novembre 1956 entre G. Mollet et K. Adenauer (DDF, 1956, t. III, 24 
octobre-31 décembre, Paris, 1990, pp. 231-238.). 
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foundations of mutual confidence22. Finally, the British and French negotiations 
concentrated on the Suez Crisis and its consequences23. Undoubtedly, the Hungarian 
Revolution was not of primary importance for either Paris or the other Western capitals. 
The Council of the Western European Union24 and the ministerial level NATO Council 
meetings of December 10th and December 11th-14th (both held in Paris) expressed similar 
attitudes. Beside the Guy Mollet Government other Western governments were also 
aware of the fact – in contrast to their own public opinions – that their possibilities to 
influence the revolutionary events in Hungary were indeed limited. More energetic steps, 
let alone a military intervention in the Soviet Bloc, did not occur as a possibility to them. 
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